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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
NATIONAL BANKS AND PROTECTIVE STATE LAWS
By
THOMAS L. WENTLING*
No Pennsylvania court has ever determined to what protection national banks
are entitled in handling deposits in this state. The Pennsylvania Banking Code'
lays down certain statutory procedures to be followed in making payment of
deposits made in the name of a minor, or in joint names, or made in the name
of one person as trustee for another, and in making payment where there is an
adverse claim.' If the statutory procedure is followed, the bank is absolved from
further liability. May national banks in Pennsylvania follow the same procedure
and be similarly protected?
The Federal banking laws and regulations do not contain any provision
granting national banks specific protection in paying out such deposits. Nor is
there any general grant of Federal power conferring upon national banks all the
privileges and protection given state banks under applicable state law. There are
indeed specific federal provisions granting to national banks 'equality with state
banks in regard to such things as the payment of interest,3 the establishing of
branch banks,' the exercise of fiduciary powers,6 and amenability to state tax-
ation. 6 In addition, national banks have been given "such incidental powers as
shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking."7 It is obviously very
doubtful if national banks could use the terms of this general grant to protect
themselves in paying out deposits.
8
Since the Federal law does not expressly confer equal protection on national
banks, it is important to determine whether the Pennsylvania law does. Generally
speaking, there is no constitutional objection to extending the' provisions of a
state statute to cover national banks. In a number of jurisdictions, including
Idaho,9 Texas,10 West Virginia," Connecticut 12 and the District of Columbia,'$
*A. B., Yale College; LL. B., Harvard Law School; member of Allegheny County Bar.
'Act of 1933, May 15, P.L. 624, 7 P.S. Sec. 819.
27 P.S. Sec. 819--902-905 Inclusive.
8Federal Reserve Act, Sec. 24, 12 U.S.C.A. Sec. 371.
4Revised Statutes, Sec. 5155(E), 12 U.S.C.A. Sec. 36(c).
5Federal Reserve Act, Sec. 11(k), 12 U.S.C.A. Sec. 248(k).
6Revised Statutes, Sec. 5219, 12 U.S.C.A. Sec. 548.
7Revised Statutes, Sec. 5136, 12 U.S.C.A. Sec. 24.
8
See Houston vs. Drake, 97 F. (2d) 863; Healey & Son vs. Stewardson National Bank (Il1. 1936),
1 N.E. (2d) 858.
9S.L. 1925 Ch. 133 Sec. 1, Idaho Code Ann. Title 25 Sec. 1202.
lOVernon's Ann. Tex. Stat. (1925 ed.) Title 16, Art. 409-410.
11W. Va. Code of 1943 Ann. Secs. 3205, 3206.
l2Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930 Rev.) Secs. 3985, 3986.
8Dist. of Columbia Code (1940) Title 26 Sees. 201-204.
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the state banking laws expressly extend their protective provisions to national
banks. In First National Bank vs. Missouri," the Supreme Court said:
"National banks are brought into existence under federal
legislation, are instrumentalities of th'e federal government and
are necessarily subject to the paramount authority of the United
States. Nevertheless, national banks are subject to the laws
of a state in respect to their affairs unless such laws interfere
with the purpose of their creation, tend to impair or destroy
their efficiency as federal agencies, or conflict with the para-
mount law of the United States."
The application of state statutes to national banks is the ordinary rule unless
the state law conflicts with the Federal law or purpose.15 The protective provi-
sions in a state banking code would facilitate rather than hinder the carrying on
of a banking business. There could be no basis for an assertion of a conflict be-
tween the state law and the Federal provisions.
Without doubt, the state legislators have the authority to protect national
banks equally with state banks. The important question, however, is not what
the legislators could have done, but what they have done. The Pennsylvania
Banking Code of 1933 must be looked to in order to determine whether it, in
accordance with legislative intent, does or does not purport to cover national
banks.
Other jurisdictions have had this same problem presented, but no final
appellate court in any state has given any illumination to the problem in an
opinion. In Utah, the banking laws apply to all banks organized or doing busi-
ness in the state "except banks organized under the laws of the United States."'
16
The Banking Code provided that banks in Utah should be protected in paying
out a deposit in the face of an adverse claim unless the claimant procured a re-
straining order qr executed a bond to the bank.1 A national bank in Salt Lake
City paid out funds upon the check of a depositor after written notice by the
plaintiffs of an adverse claim. The Utah Court18 held that the state statute con-
trolled the obligations of a national bank and that the Federal courts would en-
force the rights provided by state laws. The Court did not, in its opinion, men-
tion the fact that the Utah statute expressly excluded national banks from its
coverage.
The result reached by the Utah Court is certainly the desirable one. It would
be an almost impossible task for the Federal laws and regulations specifically to
14263 U.S. 640, 656.
1
5
McClellan vs. Chipman, 164 U.S. 347; Middletown Trust Company vs. Middletown Bank, 147
At. 22, 110 Conn. 13; Lau vs. Lau, 7 N.W. (2d) 278, 304 Mich. 218.
l 6 Utah Code Ann. (1943) 7-3-1, C.L. 17, Sec. 1015.
17Utah Code Ann. (1943) 7-3-52, L. 1929, c.68 Sec4 1.
1SNational City Bank of New York vs. Continental National Bank and Trust Company of Salt
Lake City, 83 F.(2d) 134.
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grant national banks all beneficial provisions granted undtr the corresponding
state laws, and a general grant of equal rights would be indefinite and confusing.
The obvious intent of Congress was to establish banks on a real competitive basis
with state banks, with equal rights and protection for both.
In New York, the problem of the applicability of the New York Banking
Laws has been faced several times by the lower courts. In Herrick vs. Hamilton 9
the court "inclined to the view" that the rights of depositors were the same in a
state or national bank despite the court's recognition of the fact that the sate law
apparently was drawn to cover only domestic institutions.20 In In re Hickmott's
Estate,21 the court thought the sections of the Code which governed banks and
trust companies should be applied to national banks while the sections covering
savings banks should not be applied. Other New York cases have held the same
thing. 22 In none of them was there an extended discussion of the basis for the
holding that the state law was intended to cover national banks. The New York
courts, in their desire to reach a practical result, seem to base their decisions on
the theory of similarity in function and purpose between state and federal banks.
To illustrate, in Garlock's Estate,23 the court held that although Section 249 of the
Banking Code applied literally only to savings banks, it should be extended to
cover savings and loan associations "since money is deposited there also for the
purpose of saving."
The Pennsylvania courts need not have as much difficulty as the New York
judges in reaching the same result. The Pennsylvania Banking Code does not
'expressly include or exclude national banks. Whether they are to be included is
wholly a matter of interpretation. The protective provisions of the Pennsyl-
vania Act are in consecutive sections of the Code. 2 Each of these sections applies
to an "institution," according to the statutory language. As to the scope of "in-
stitution," the section 2 of the Code on Definitions declares:
"Institution includes any bank, bank and trust company,
savings bank, trust cumpany or private bank."
In the same section, a "bank" and a "bank and trust company" are defined.
They are defined to "include" any bank or bank and trust company incorporated
under the Act of 1933, or under the Act of 1876, or under any special act of
the General Assembly of Pennsylvania. In handling most of the other definitions
in this same section, the legislature used the word "means" instead of the word
"include" between the word to be defined and the definition. The use of the
19160 Misc. 440, 290 N.Y.S. 65.
20Art. 3 and art. 6 of the N.Y. Banking Law (L. 1914, Ch. 369).
21256 App. Div. 1047, 10 N.Y.S. (2d) 918.
.
2
In Re Riley's Estate, 261 App. Div. 690, 27 N.Y.S. (2d) 176; Community Vol. Fire Co. of Nim-
monsburg vs. City National Bank, 171 Misc. 1027, 14 N.Y.S. (2d) 306
28157 Misc. 571, 285 N.Y.S. 52.
247 P.S. Sec. 819-902-905.
257 P.S. Sec. 819-2.
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world "include" in defining bank, and bank and trust company by the legislatur'e
is of real significance. "Include" is a word of enlargement and not of restric-
tion. It is generally used to indicate an addition rather than merely to specify.
For -example, in this same list of definitions, "includes" is used instead of "means"
in the definition of the word "attorney." "Attorney," it is said, "includes any
attorney at law who receives a general retainer as solicitor or as counsel for an
institution." Certainly, this is no attempt to define "attorney" generally. Attorneys
are not thereby restricted to those receiving general retainers from state banks.
Similarly, the listing of certain state banks and bank and trust companies after
the word "include" is not an attempt by definition to restrict the applicability of
the Banking Code to state banks. The listing was probably made merely to assure
the legislative purpose to have the Code apply to banks organized prior to 1933.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in construing a statute, has said:
"The terms 'means' and 'includes' are not necessarily
synonymous. The distinction in their use is aptly pointed out by
Sections 2, 200 of the Act itself. Section 2(a) gives general
definitions of ten terms; of these, three are stated to 'include'
designated particular instances, the other seven are stated to
'mean' the definitions subsequently given. Section 200, in ad-
dition to the definitions contained in subsection (a), gives
four of which two use the verb 'include' and two the verb
'means'. That the draftsman used these words in a different
sense seems clear. The natural distinction would be that where
'means' is employed, the term and its definition are to be inter-
changeable equivalents and that the verb 'includes' imports
a general class, some of whose particular instances are those
specified in the definition."
26
In like view, a Texas Court declared that the words '"include" and "includ-
ing" were not to be regarded as being identical or equivalent to "such less elastic
words and terms as 'meant' or 'meaning' or 'by which is meant.' While the word
'including' is susceptible of different shades of meaning, it is generally employed
as a term of enlargement and not a term of limitation or of enumeration." 
27
And in In re Goetz,28 the court pointed out that in a bequest "of all my personal
property including furniture, plate, etc.," the word "including" did not limit
the bequest to the property 'enumerated after the word.
29
The Pennsylvania legislature did not intend to bar national banks from the
protection of the Code. The use of the word "include" is not an appropriate
one upon which to base an exclusion. Our courts need have no difficulty in
26Helvering vs. Morgan's, Inc., 293 U.S. 121, at 125 note, 55 S. Ct. 60; Accord: Harris vs. State.
175 So 342, 179 Miss. 38.
2 7
Peerless Carbon Black Co. vs. Sheppard. (Texas Civil Appeals) 113 S.W. (2d) 996, 997.
2875 N.Y.S. 750, 71 App. Div. 272.
2
9
See Weller and Weller vs. Grange Co., 105 Pa. Super. 547, for a general discussion by a Penn-
sylvania Court of the meaning of the word "include." And see Cannon vs. Nicholas, 80 F(2d)
934, and cases cited.
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holding that national banks are protected by the state law. These provisions
of the Code are declaratory of the public policy of the state in regard to the
handling by banks of certain types of deposits. That public policy should have
general application. To hold otherwise would put national banks at an almost
intolerable disadvantage in competing with state banks. For example, the in-
ability of a national bank readily to pay over a deposit to a "Totten" trust bene-
ficiary or to a minor would be a serious hindrance to their efficient operation in
the banking business. Certainly, such a result would be contrary to the spirit
of competition and parity contemplated by Congress. Fortunately, the wording
of our state Code requires no such result.
